



In the 2013 Italian elections the centre-left coalition is almost
certain to win a majority in the Chamber of Deputies, but is
very unlikely to win a majority in the Senate.
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Parliamentary elections are due to be held in Italy on 24-25 February. As part of EUROPP’s
series previewing the election, Chris Hanretty predicts the final results by pooling the most
recent polling data. His findings indicate that the centre-left coalition, led by Pier Luigi
Bersani of the Partito Democratico (PD), is almost certain to win a majority in the Chamber
of Deputies. However they are very unlikely to gain a majority in the Senate, falling just ten
seats short.
With the publication of  polls now banned in the run up to the Italian general election of
the 24th and 25th February, we’ll never have a better opportunity to examine party support, and how that
translates into seats. Over the past f our weeks, I’ve collected inf ormation f rom 180 dif f erent polls asking
about vote intention nation-wide and in the dif f erent regions used to allocate seats in the upper
chamber, the Senate. Through pooling these polls using Bayesian methods (similar to the methods used
by Rob Ford and others f or the UK, and originally by Simon Jackman), and through estimating the link
between national support and support in each of  the regions, I’ve been able to generate a f orecast f or
the distribution of  seats in both chambers.
There are two clear conclusions f rom this f orecast. The f irst is that the centre- lef t is almost certain to
be the largest coalit ion by vote share in the Camera (Chamber of  Deputies). Under the Italian electoral
system, that means that it picks up a guaranteed majority of  340 seats, or 55 per cent of  the seats
available.
The second conclusion is that the centre- lef t has a vanishingly small probability (around 5 per cent) of
winning a majority in the Senate. It is likely to be the second largest coalit ion in the key regions of
Lombardy and the Veneto. That means that instead the centre-right picks up the winner ’s bonus f or
those regions, leaving the centre- lef t a handf ul of  seats short of  a majority. Figure 1 shows the
predicted Senate seats f or each of  the main parties (based on the median value of  projections).
Figure 1: Predicted Seats by Party in the 2013 Italian Senate Elections
The f ault lies not with the incredible policy promises made by Berlusconi (whose party has nevertheless
recouped around f our percentage points since mid-December), but with the electoral system. There were
many objectives behind the 2005 ref orm of  the electoral system (objectives which I’ve discussed in a
paper together with Alan Renwick and David Hine), but one objective was to create incentives f or clear
alternation between competing lef t and right wing majorit ies. The winner ’s bonus in the Camera — which
gives the largest coalit ion or largest single party a top-up to 340 seats — was introduced with this
objective in mind. A similar bonus is also f ound in Greece. This is a very inelegant f orm of  institutional
engineering, but at least the link between objective and means is clear.
The same can’t be said f or the winner ’s bonuses in the Senate. Because the Italian constitution specif ies
that the Senate must be elected on a regional basis, the bonuses are not applied nationally, but rather in
a series of  dif f erent regional contests. Because party support is not unif ormly distributed across the
country, that means that the party which loses the popular vote is very likely to recoup a substantial haul
of  seats in at least one Senate region. The Senate makes a majoritarian mechanism into a counter-
majoritarian check. It ’s a minor miracle that the system hasn’t delivered a split outcome in the two
previous elections in which it ’s been used.
There’s no use crying over spilt milk — or in this case, misallocated regional premia. What is the most
likely outcome f or government if  the distribution of  seats is as I predict? It is f air to say that the most
widely rumoured post-electoral coalit ion is not, in f act, a coalit ion between the members of  the centre-
lef t electoral coalit ion, but a coalit ion between the Partito Democratico (PD) and Mario Monti: with PD
leader Pier Luigi Bersani as Prime Minister and Monti as Finance minister. This scenario would be f ar f rom
ideal in a number of  ways.
First, this would resurrect a tradit ional vice of  the First Italian Republic: governments chosen not by
voters presented with a clear choice between opposing teams, but by polit icians engaged in post-
electoral coalit ion f ormation. This vice was thought to have been eliminated by the electoral ref orms of
1992 and that of  2005. If  the government that f ormed were not chosen by the voters, and included a
large centrist element, it would mean that the ref orm of  2005 had f ailed to achieve any of  its intended
goals.
Second, such a coalit ion would also depend on an unusual degree of  unity f rom all parties in the
coalit ion. Centrist members of  the coalit ion in particular would f ace considerable pressure, or
considerable inducements, to def ect to the opposition. This, indeed, was precisely what happened during
the short- lived second Romano Prodi government of  2006 to 2008.
It is theref ore dif f icult to look at the seat shares shown in f igure 1 and envisage the parliament elected in
2013 lasting until 2018. Premature elections seem likely. Whether they take place six months af ter the
polls, in the hope that f resh autumn elections can provide clarity where spring elections f ailed, or instead
take place two years af ter the polls, f ollowing the dissolution of  a f ractious centre/centre- lef t coalit ion,
is not yet clear.
A more detailed discussion of the results is available at: “The 2013 Italian election: a poll-based forecast”
Please read our comments policy before commenting.
Note:  This article gives the views of the author, and not the position of EUROPP – European Politics and
Policy, nor of the London School of Economics.
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